Chronology of Peirce's Life
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839-1914)
A chronological list of major events in Peirce's life.
No date given. Circa 2010.
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1839-1914
According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 11, in this paper, Peirce argues for a radically anti-Cartesian epistemology centered around four denials: "(1) we have no power of introspection, but all knowledge of the internal world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external facts, (2) we have no power of intuition, but every cogniton is determined logically by previous cognitions, (3) we have no power of thinking without signs, and (4) we have no conception of the absolutely incognizable."
]]>Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man
First published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 2 (1868): 103-114, this paper is the first of a series of three that appeared in the same journal during the period 1868-1869.
According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 11, in this paper, Peirce argues for a radically anti-Cartesian epistemology centered around four denials: "(1) we have no power of introspection, but all knowledge of the internal world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external facts, (2) we have no power of intuition, but every cogniton is determined logically by previous cognitions, (3) we have no power of thinking without signs, and (4) we have no conception of the absolutely incognizable."
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839-1914)
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 2 (1868): 103-114
1868
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According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 108, "the objective of the 'Illustrations' is 'to describe the method of scientific investigation'." In this, the first paper, "he develops his thesis that thought is a form of inquiry, and belief the cessation of doubt, and he emphasizes the self-corrective nature of the scientific enterprise. He further discusses four methods of fixing belief (those of tenacity and of authority, the a priori method, and the method of science) and argues that only the fourth, which along appeals to an 'external permanency,' can lead to success in the long run."
]]>The Fixation of Belief
Originally published in the Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12 (November 1877): 1-15. This is the first installment of six papers in Peirce's "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" series.
According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 108, "the objective of the 'Illustrations' is 'to describe the method of scientific investigation'." In this, the first paper, "he develops his thesis that thought is a form of inquiry, and belief the cessation of doubt, and he emphasizes the self-corrective nature of the scientific enterprise. He further discusses four methods of fixing belief (those of tenacity and of authority, the a priori method, and the method of science) and argues that only the fourth, which along appeals to an 'external permanency,' can lead to success in the long run."
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839-1914)
Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12 (November 1877): 1-15
1877-11
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According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 124, this paper "criticizes Descartes' doctrine of the clearness of ideas and goes on to develop Peirce's own theory, according to which there are three levels or grades of clearness. The theory of meaning associated with the third grade of clearness is represented in the pragmatic maxim," which Peirce then applies toward the clarification of conceptions like 'hardness', 'weight', and 'reality'.
]]>How to Make Our Ideas Clear
Originally published in the Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12 (January 1878): 286-302. This is the second installment in Peirce's "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" series.
According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 124, this paper "criticizes Descartes' doctrine of the clearness of ideas and goes on to develop Peirce's own theory, according to which there are three levels or grades of clearness. The theory of meaning associated with the third grade of clearness is represented in the pragmatic maxim," which Peirce then applies toward the clarification of conceptions like 'hardness', 'weight', and 'reality'.
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839-1914)
Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12 (January 1878): 286-302
1878-01
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According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 142, this paper is "an early discussion of what will later become [Peirce's doctrine] of synechism", i.e., continuity. Here "Peirce argues that the assumption of continuity provides a powerful engine for logic, and he develops his theory of probabilities as the science of logic quantitatively treated....To be logical, Peirce says, men must not be selfish, for logic requires the identification of one's interests with those of an unlimited community."
]]>The Doctrine of Chances
Originally published in the Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12 (March 1878): 604-615. This is the third installment in Peirce's "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" series. It was originally intended by Peirce to be published as one paper along with the fourth installment in the series, "The Probability of Induction".
According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 142, this paper is "an early discussion of what will later become [Peirce's doctrine] of synechism", i.e., continuity. Here "Peirce argues that the assumption of continuity provides a powerful engine for logic, and he develops his theory of probabilities as the science of logic quantitatively treated....To be logical, Peirce says, men must not be selfish, for logic requires the identification of one's interests with those of an unlimited community."
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839-1914)
Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12 (March 1878): 604-615
1878-03
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According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 155, in this paper, "Peirce continues to develop his theory of probability and give rules for calculating the probability of multiple events. He compares the conceptualistic view (which refers probabilities to events) with the materialistic view (which makes probability the ratio of the frequency of favorable cases to all cases) and differentiates chance from probability. He argues for the frequency view (which he held until nearly the turn of the century) and then connects his views on probability with the nature of inductive (or synthetic) reasoning and the problem of induction, for which he considers the need for an appeal to possible worlds."
]]>The Probability of Induction
Originally published in the Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12 (April 1878): 705-718. This is the fourth installment of six papers in Peirce's "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" series.
According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 155, in this paper, "Peirce continues to develop his theory of probability and give rules for calculating the probability of multiple events. He compares the conceptualistic view (which refers probabilities to events) with the materialistic view (which makes probability the ratio of the frequency of favorable cases to all cases) and differentiates chance from probability. He argues for the frequency view (which he held until nearly the turn of the century) and then connects his views on probability with the nature of inductive (or synthetic) reasoning and the problem of induction, for which he considers the need for an appeal to possible worlds."
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839-1914)
Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12 (April 1878): 705-718
1878-04
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According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 170, in this paper, "Peirce argues against Mill's view that the uniformity of nature is the sole warrant for induction and ... that induction should be explained by the doctrine of probabilities."
]]>The Order of Nature
Originally published in the Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12 (June 1878): 203-217. This is the fifth installment of six papers in Peirce's "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" series.
According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 170, in this paper, "Peirce argues against Mill's view that the uniformity of nature is the sole warrant for induction and ... that induction should be explained by the doctrine of probabilities."
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839-1914)
Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12 (June 1878): 203-217
1878-06
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According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 186, in this paper, "Peirce continues his 'Illustrations' [series] with a discussion of the three kinds of reasoning (deduction, induction, hypothesis) based on the general form of syllogistic argument composed of rule, case, and result. With examples from the history of science, he demonstrates that hypothesis is different from induction proper."
]]>Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis
Originally published in the Popular Science Monthly, vol. 13 (August 1878): 470-482. This is the sixth and final installment of six papers in Peirce's "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" series.
According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 186, in this paper, "Peirce continues his 'Illustrations' [series] with a discussion of the three kinds of reasoning (deduction, induction, hypothesis) based on the general form of syllogistic argument composed of rule, case, and result. With examples from the history of science, he demonstrates that hypothesis is different from induction proper."
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839-1914)
Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12 (August 1878): 470-482
1878-08
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According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 28, in this paper, Peirce extends the previous paper, "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man." Here he "develops an account of mind and reality ... asserts that all mental events are valid inferences, and claims that as every thought is a sign, so man himself is a sign. He also gives a fairly detailed account of his theory of signs as of 1868, and makes his first published declaration for scholastic realism."
]]>Some Consequences of Four Incapacities
First published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 2 (1868): 140-157, this paper is the second of a series of three that appeared in the same journal during the period 1868-1869.
According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 28, in this paper, Peirce extends the previous paper, "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man." Here he "develops an account of mind and reality ... asserts that all mental events are valid inferences, and claims that as every thought is a sign, so man himself is a sign. He also gives a fairly detailed account of his theory of signs as of 1868, and makes his first published declaration for scholastic realism."
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839-1914)
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 2 (1868): 140-157
1868
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According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 56, in this paper, "Peirce works out a rationale for the objective validity of the laws of logic and, by linking epistemology with a social theory of logic, grounds induction in altruistic sentiments. He also discusses a version of the liar paradox and offers a solution based on the supposition that 'every proposition asserts its own truth,' and he makes his first published reference to De Morgan's work on the logic of relations."
]]>Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four Incapacities
First published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 2 (1869): 193-208, this paper is the third and final installment of a series of three that appeared in the same journal during the period 1868-1869.
According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 56, in this paper, "Peirce works out a rationale for the objective validity of the laws of logic and, by linking epistemology with a social theory of logic, grounds induction in altruistic sentiments. He also discusses a version of the liar paradox and offers a solution based on the supposition that 'every proposition asserts its own truth,' and he makes his first published reference to De Morgan's work on the logic of relations."
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839-1914)
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 2 (1869): 193-208
1869
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