According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 11, in this paper, Peirce argues for a radically anti-Cartesian epistemology centered around four denials: "(1) we have no power of introspection, but all knowledge of the internal world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external facts, (2) we have no power of intuition, but every cogniton is determined logically by previous cognitions, (3) we have no power of thinking without signs, and (4) we have no conception of the absolutely incognizable."
]]>Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man
First published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 2 (1868): 103-114, this paper is the first of a series of three that appeared in the same journal during the period 1868-1869.
According to Houser and Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1992), p. 11, in this paper, Peirce argues for a radically anti-Cartesian epistemology centered around four denials: "(1) we have no power of introspection, but all knowledge of the internal world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external facts, (2) we have no power of intuition, but every cogniton is determined logically by previous cognitions, (3) we have no power of thinking without signs, and (4) we have no conception of the absolutely incognizable."
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839-1914)
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 2 (1868): 103-114
1868
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English
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